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Abstract 
 
Philosopher and theologian, Bernard Lonergan, S.J., regarded as one of the most influential Jesuit thinkers of 
the twentieth century, focused primarily on cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics. His system of 
thought known as “intentionality analysis” has been applied widely to many fields of study, including 
education. While Lonergan directly addressed certain issues in education and educational philosophy, his 
thought has greater promise for educational philosophy through broader application, specifically in ordering 
and expanding educational themes related to the four key differentiations of consciousness he expounds. The 
differentiations are explained as distinct but interrelated levels of consciousness and consist of experiencing, 
understanding, judging and deciding.  For educational philosophy, “experiencing” draws attention to the vast 
array of sensory input, affectivity and the experience of ideas. “Understanding” brings to light the questioning 
process that seeks intelligibility for human experience, direct and indirect, where the processes and 
achievements of intelligence become the focus. “Judging” concerns questions of the good, the right and the 
true, and provides an expanded context of critical thinking and reasonableness encompassing knowledge of 
not only the world but also of oneself.  “Deciding” wrestles with the existential questions of life and 
promotes responsible living expressed in moral agency, social justice, service to one’s communities, and 
engaged citizenship.  More than adding new educational theory or pedagogical innovation (though these may 
result with further practical application of intentionality analysis), the promise of Lonergan’s thought for 
education philosophy appears as a larger framework for deep thinking about education that distinguishes 
important themes and concerns and interrelates them to a comprehensive and open-ended horizon that 
champions human potentials for attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility.             
 
 
Introduction 
 
Bernard Lonergan, S.J., is considered by some to 
be one of the greatest Jesuit thinkers of the 
twentieth century.  He is also thought to be in the 
top tier of Jesuit intellectuals since their founding 
in 1540.  Others have compared Lonergan to Saint 
Thomas Aquinas and to Immanuel Kant in terms 
of intellectual reach and profundity.  George 
Whelan, S.J., professor of theology at the 
Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome offers a 
concise summary of his celebrated life and work. 
 
Bernard Lonergan was a Canadian Jesuit who 
lived from 1904 to 1984.  He was a 
philosopher and theologian and he is mostly 
known for two seminal works: Insight (1957) 
and Method in Theology (1972).  He was both a 
student and a professor at the Pontifical 
Gregorian University in Rome and also taught 
in Montreal, Boston and Toronto.  During the 
1970s he was featured on the cover of Time 
magazine and he was “considered one of the 
finest philosophic thinkers of the twentieth 
Century,” and in a recently published book, 
Twentieth Century Catholic Thinkers by Fergus 
Kerr, he makes the top ten list formulated by 
this author of the most important Catholic 
thinkers of the last century.1     
  
As a theologian, Lonergan did not adapt any 
particular philosophical system of thought or 
theoretical constructs for theological purposes–as 
did, for instance, Karl Rahner using Martin 
Heidegger or Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
employing evolutional theory and physics. Rather, 
he sought to develop a new mode of philosophy 
that would place theological inquiry on a sound, 
productive, collaborative, methodological 
footing—mirroring in certain ways empirical 
method and perhaps its successes. While 
Lonergan’s immediate focus was on theological 
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method, he discovered a more general method 
that also applies to scholarship within the 
humanities.  To be sure, there are profound 
differences in scientific and humanist studies.  For 
instance, you cannot put human justice in a petri 
dish and study it through repeatable 
experimentation, and how one “feels” about 
RU(44), Ruthenium, is of little concern to the 
scientist. Essentially, the difference pertains to 
what is studied.  But are there general structures 
and processes of scientific empirical inquiry that 
relate to and inform inquiry in the humanities? To 
answer this question, Lonergan probed the basic 
nature of scientific inquiry, and then from this he 
developed what came to be known as a 
“generalized empirical method,” and subsequently 
“intentionality analysis.”  His central focus 
became, not what is studied, but the nature of 
study itself, the nature of inquiry and human 
understanding. 
 
The essay expresses my contention that 
Lonergan’s work constructing a new mode of 
philosophy based on the nature and processes of 
human inquiry, along with its resulting general 
methodology, has particular relevance to the field 
of educational philosophy. I attempt to build the 
case for this application of Lonergan’s method, 
presented as “intentionality analysis,” by situating 
and interrelating within this framework some great 
themes of educational theory and practice, past 
and present, and suggest that this holds particular 
promise for a new, comprehensive educational 
philosophy.2     
 
First, however, I offer a caveat. This essay is not 
really for the seasoned Lonergan scholar who may 
be inclined to engage the intricacies of 
hermeneutics in deciphering precise meanings of 
words and phrases Lonergan uses, if and how they 
may have changed over his writing career, whether 
or not, for instance, there is a fifth level in the 
differentiations of consciousness, or how 
Lonergan’s thought can inform the finer points of 
theology and cognate disciplines. While these are 
engaging, animating, and perhaps needed 
clarifications or developments in Lonergan’s 
thought, many educators generally do not have the 
background, nor the time or the patience for this 
type of investigation and conversation. This essay 
aims to introduce educators to Lonergan’s grand 
vision and seeks to help practitioners glimpse 
simply some possibilities for their own thinking 
and approach in education. Educators tend to be 
pragmatists—there is a job to do, and an 
important one at that, and the “tools” one uses in 
the classroom, in the seminar, online or on 
campus, need to be readily grasped and effectively 
wielded.  My hope is that this essay will help in 
that grasping and wielding, and that more 
practitioners in the field of educational practice 
and theory may benefit from his great mind.  
 
What I endeavor to do, then, is to present a basic, 
hopefully clear, and relatively concise account of 
key ideas Lonergan espouses along with the 
system of thought for which he is known.  These 
basic ideas and system of thought hold promise 
for reconstituting educational philosophy and for 
informing so much of what happens in the 
classroom. But in aiming at what is basic and 
relatively simple I do not suggest Lonergan’s work 
is simplistic.  Quite the opposite; it is profound 
and radical.  But I maintain that realizing some 
effect of Lonergan’s thought in how we 
understand and engage teaching and learning 
processes can be obtained rather quickly, even 
though “mastering the instrument” of Lonergan’s 
full-fledged system of thought and gaining its full 
effect constitutes a project requiring deep-level 
attention and commitment over a lifetime.  
 
Some may believe that “a little of Lonergan goes a 
long way,” including perhaps even a few of his 
fellow Jesuits.  However, in very helpful ways, a 
little of Lonergan can go a long way.  One needs to 
grasp but a few key ideas, a few principles, 
understand them in terms of one’s own interiority, 
and then start to follow the leads by way of a few 
basic “imperatives,” as Lonergan calls them, for 
the effect to take hold and for his thought 
potentially to be life enriching and even 
transforming.  By way of introduction, I will begin 
by profiling Lonergan, the philosopher and 
theologian, and then offer some general 
assessments of his work. This will lead to a brief 
account of some of the broad mindscape of 
educational philosophy. This rather lengthy 
introduction, lengthy because many will not have 
much background in educational philosophy or 
the thought of Lonergan, then leads to an 
explanation of the key elements of Lonergan’s 
philosophy and in very general terms how these 
can direct and inform deep thinking about 
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education.  The essay concludes with a general 
assessment of Lonergan’s thought for educational 
philosophy and in what ways I believe this holds 
promise for educational philosophy.   
 
Lonergan the Philosopher 
As a scholar, Lonergan drew on a variety of 
thought in philosophy, science, mathematics, 
history and religion, as well as the Greek and 
medieval classics.  His scholarship was well-
engaged in contemporary fields of philosophy of 
science, historicism, and existentialism. 
Throughout his work, Lonergan situated various 
philosophies and systems of thought within an 
integrated framework where key ideas from the 
great Western intellectual tradition contribute to 
an enlarging and ultimately comprehensive 
worldview.  As a philosopher, he sought to create 
a radical mode of philosophical inquiry that brings 
together and expands insight on the nature of 
human experience, the nature of understanding, 
the structure and operations of human 
discernment and judgment, to an account of the 
existential moment of decision and of how 
persons seek to make their way in the world. 
Aspects of his reconstruction of philosophy are 
well-presented by philosopher, Hugo Meynell in 
his book, Redirecting Philosophy: Reflections on the 
Nature of Knowledge from Plato to Lonergan.3 
 
In addition to his achievements in philosophy, 
Lonergan also was a noted theologian.  Bringing 
together these two fields of study, theology and 
philosophy, he wrote a major treatise on human 
cognitional theory, epistemology and metaphysics 
called, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.4  
Completed in 1953, but first published in 1957, 
this work established Lonergan as a major thinker 
of the 20th century (although his thought still does 
not garner the wide attention it perhaps deserves).  
 
The conviction becomes clear in Insight that the 
study of human inquiry and knowledge, the field 
of inquiry called “epistemology,” shows that 
understanding and knowing are basic to human 
beings and deeply affects how we carve out our 
existence in the world.  Lonergan has become 
known for this epithet,  “thoroughly understand 
what it is to understand, and not only will you 
understand the broad lines of all there is to be 
understood but also you will possess a fixed base, 
an invariant pattern, opening upon all further 
developments of understanding.”5  Insight explores 
and answers three basic questions: What does one 
do when one knows? Why is doing that called 
knowing? What does one know when that is 
done? Answers to these questions constitute 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory, his epistemology 
and his metaphysics. 
 
Lonergan the Theologian 
In Insight, Lonergan focused on the processes of 
understanding and resulting methodology across a 
broad spectrum of human inquiry, then in 
subsequent writings he explored theological 
methodology in particular. Insight showed that the 
human mind—understood in terms of human 
consciousness—has distinct levels and operations. 
These levels and operations most properly work in 
distinct but integrated ways as persons comes to 
experience the world, interpret and understand 
that world, comes to grasp what counts as 
knowledge (both in terms of probabilities and 
correct judgments), and then decides to act (or not 
act) in accord with that knowledge. He came to 
regard human consciousness as a patterned set of 
operations that produce increments of personal 
and collective knowledge, and that insight and 
knowledge amass cumulatively. Lonergan showed 
that human consciousness, basically and optimally, 
tends to unfold methodologically even though we 
may not explicitly understand or acknowledge that 
method. However, the more we understand and 
better engage consciousness as a patterned and 
cumulatively progressive operation, the more 
“methodological” we become and, increasingly, 
we become more effective, productive, caring and 
loving, authentic human beings.  It is important to 
note that the method Lonergan elucidates in not 
at all like a recipe or an assembly-line production. 
Rather, it is a matter of understanding and of 
drawing on the power and potentialities—the 
intentionalities—of our own consciousness.     
 
How, then, does this relate to theology?  Can the 
actual structure and operations of human 
consciousness, as Lonergan maps them out, direct 
one’s mode of theological inquiry?  To this he 
answered, “Yes,” in his most widely influential 
book, Method in Theology, published in 1972.6  
Following some preliminary chapters on method, 
the human good, history, and related topics, he 
developed a new way to “do” theology.  His 
theological method unfolds in eight “functional 
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specialties” that pertain to broad disciplines in 
theology—four conducted primarily by the 
academic (who may or may not be a person of 
faith) and four by the theologian committed to a 
particular religious tradition.  These are: research, 
interpretation, history, and dialectics—the first 
four, and then foundations, doctrines, systematics, 
and communications—the last four.  Not only 
does his methodology endeavor to order and 
direct theological inquiry in a methodological 
manner, that is, as a “normative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations yielding 
cumulative and progressive results,” but also it 
provides a framework for more intentional 
interplay of academic inquiry and of theological 
collaboration.   
 
General Assessment of Lonergan’s Thought 
In my estimation, Lonergan’s vision was as grand 
as de Chardin’s in terms of understanding the 
cosmos, and as existential as Rahner’s in coming 
to terms with “being” in its human dimensions.  It 
seems to me, however, that Lonergan was far 
more rigorous than de Chardin or Rahner, or 
many others for that matter, in addressing a larger 
scope of related fundamental questions and, in the 
process, he achieved more profound results.  One 
issue of Newsweek in the 1970s explained, “Jesuit 
Philosopher Bernard Lonergan has set out to do 
for the twentieth century what even Aquinas could 
not do for the thirteenth…Insight has become a 
philosophic classic comparable in scope to 
Hume’s Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.”7   
 
John Macquarrie, a widely influential theologian of 
the last half of the 20th century, offers his 
assessment as well. “[Lonergan’s] massive work, 
Insight, reminds one of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind because it 
works through the various levels of mental 
operation from the simplest to the most complex 
and leaves one with an extraordinarily impressive 
picture of the power and energy of the human 
intellect.”8  Clearly, Lonergan was, and remains, an 
important thinker as evident today by the many 
Lonergan institutes and centers around the world.9 
 
I believe Lonergan, like many great intellectuals, 
has something significant to contribute to 
conversation on education. If we take a little time 
to begin to come to terms with some of 
Lonergan’s key assertions, it could be worth the 
effort by having expanded and deepened our 
understanding of what we do in education and, 
more importantly, as Parker Palmer suggests, to 
grasp more deeply who we are as human-beings-
as-educators.10  
 
Lonergan’s Thought for Educational 
Philosophy 
Lonergan was no stranger to the field of 
educational philosophy.  Although this field of 
study was not his main focus by any means, like 
many great thinkers—Michael Oakeshott, 
Northrop Frye, and even Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Immanuel Kant, as examples—he was asked from 
time to time to address issues related to education 
and educational philosophy.  The most noted 
occasion for Lonergan was a series of lectures he 
delivered at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio 
in 1959.  Insight was already into a second edition, 
and Lonergan was making his mark nationally and 
internationally.  On this occasion he addressed 
educators over several days on matters related to 
Dewey’s and Piaget’s work on education, but also 
presented his own thought on ethics, art and 
history, among other topics.  The lectures were 
tape recorded, transcribed, and then published in 
1988 as Volume 10, Topics in Education, of the 
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan.11  
 
As the title suggests, the book consists of a set of 
topics addressed by Lonergan, and while 
philosophical in nature, he did not intend to 
present a “philosophy of education” where deep 
level, systematic and comprehensive accounts of 
education unfold.  He ended his first of ten 
lectures with this proviso and invitation: 
 
I am not a specialist in education, but I 
have suffered under educators for very 
many years, and I have been teaching 
for an equally long time …. [Y]ou can 
listen to me as I speak about 
philosophy and its relation to theology 
and to concrete living. But most of the 
concrete applications, the ironing out 
of the things, will have to be done by 
you who are in the fields of education 
and philosophy of education.12 
 
The application of Lonergan’s thought, then, in 
this essay consists of an effort in the “ironing out 
of things” that intends to inform a philosophy of 
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education.  What I am after here is not a full 
blown account of the breadth and richness of 
Lonergan’s thought as it relates to the broad 
spectrum of education and educational 
philosophy.  To do this, one would need to 
encounter the full scope of his thought 
throughout the projected 25 volumes of his 
Collected Works.  Rather, I present a basic 
understanding of his key assertions, what they 
generally could mean and how they hold promise 
for education.  
 
“Educational philosophy” may be a mode of 
thinking not often engaged by many educators, 
including educators in higher education, since 
many college and university professors have never 
taken a course or read much in “educational 
studies” or in educational philosophy.  So let us 
consider briefly some key elements of an 
educational philosophy.  In simple terms, 
educational philosophy addresses the more 
profound, deep-level matters related to teaching 
and learning that cover a wide range of topics 
from epistemology, ethics, and citizenship to 
personal formation and development, social 
concerns, and “new thinking” as this comes to 
bear on the theory and practice of education. 
Recent examples of new thinking explores various 
kinds of “intelligences,”  “knowledge ascriptions,” 
and “human capabilities.”13  Educational 
philosophy helps educators think deeply, critically, 
and creatively about the big issues related to 
human emotional and intellectual development, as 
well as to existential and social life, and helps 
educators—and ultimately the persons being 
educated (one hopes)—relate these issues and 
resulting assertions and affirmations to one’s basic 
values and commitments. While practitioners and 
administrators in the field of education wrestle 
with real problems in the classroom, in the 
seminar, the conference auditorium and the office, 
educational philosophy can help educators raise 
the eyes from the road immediately afoot to 
consider the longer view, the greater good, a 
better way, and the ultimate consequences.  It is 
my contention that Lonergan can help one engage 
these types of reflections and help move one 
along the exciting journey of educational 
philosophy. 
 
For Lonergan, philosophical thinking and the 
construction of a credible philosophy depend 
fundamentally on an account of human 
consciousness. Without a clear and accurate grasp 
of what is going on in our own patterns and 
operations of consciousness, he claims, we simply 
are left to muddle through as best we can, living 
essentially in a world of extroversion (or what 
Lonergan calls “naïve realism”), struggling with 
confusing or wrong-headed ideas about culture 
and society, about human life and what it means 
to be human, or avoiding these types of questions 
altogether, and ultimately ending up with 
problematic ideas about what counts as “the 
good,” the “true” and “reality” itself.  Ascribing to 
some version of naïve realism with its common 
expressions in various forms of “pragmatism,” we 
can get by in education, sure enough, but it is very 
difficult to make substantive, fully satisfying 
progress in sorting through the complex and 
profound issues that face us today. In the end, the 
naïve realist may very likely end up being 
inadequate to meet deep challenges facing our 
society and culture, or, as philosopher José Ortega 
y Gasset suggests, unable to “mount to the level 
of one’s time.”14  Rather, we may tend to rise to 
the “level of our incompetence.”  At best, 
understanding life’s big issues and relating them to 
the grand enterprise of education would be “hit 
and miss,” or more likely to be a matter largely 
avoided.   
 
Merely Muddling Through 
Compared to an engagement with philosophy and 
the “big” questions, education today often seems 
to be a matter of “muddling through,” of chasing 
after this or that trend in popular culture and 
technology, of merely responding to immediate 
problems rather than taking the lead and 
articulating matters of deep concern and of 
enduring importance in society and education.  
For instance, in 2013 and 2014, public discourse 
on educational issues focused much on a “core 
curriculum” and whether or not in American 
communities, regions or states should adopt this 
standard.  While achieving basic literacies is 
important, where is the concern for educating for 
democracy, for citizenship, for contributing to the 
common good, or for living an authentic life?  
One wonders if educators and administrators tend 
to be led by issues defined by others, politicians in 
particular, issues such as “discipline,” “standards,” 
“back-to-basics,” “no child left behind,” “values 
clarification,” “ethics,” “computer literacy,” 
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“social media,” as examples of topics that have 
commanded attention over the past several years. 
Clearly, these concerns have some importance, but 
with the educational agenda set largely by politics 
and the public purse, educators today tend not to 
be in the vanguard but rather left lagging behind 
and responding to politicians, media personalities 
or various community groups. Response, of 
course, is important, but others tend to set the 
agenda. Driven by politics, by budget constraints, 
by the winds of immediate community concern, 
administrators and leading educators seem less 
able to draw on well-developed, overarching, 
systematic modes of thought to fully understand, 
assess, and decide on these issues in an integrative, 
comprehensive and fully satisfying way. When 
educators are compelled to respond to myriad 
issues that detract from ultimate concerns in 
education, at most we can hope simply to 
“muddle through,” aiming merely to see students 
graduate with acceptable grades, hoping they make 
the best of things in the real world.  This 
characterization may be overly pessimistic and 
rather limited, and no doubt there are many 
individual examples that represent hope for 
positive change in educational theory and practice.   
My point simply is to draw attention to some of 
the problems facing education today, including the 
paucity of deep-level thinking on these problems, 
and suggest that we can obtain that deep-level 
thinking by aid of Lonergan and that we find 
promise in Lonergan by rethinking educational 
philosophy in certain ways. Taking the time and 
effort to consider the larger, deeper questions in 
education can help educators attain a clearer 
vision of the enterprise of education, and that in 
Lonergan  there is promise to transcend the 
“muddling through” approaches to achieve that 
higher viewpoint that can profoundly affect 
education in good ways—both for the teacher and 
the student.   
 
The noted Canadian historian, philosopher, and 
intellectual, George Grant, offered his insight on 
the state of education in the West during the last 
half of the 20th century. 
 
Mass technological education took place in 
North America increasingly in large and 
powerful institutions, which produced 
rudderless people who have never been taught 
to think deeply about the philosophical and 
theological traditions of the West. … However, 
it will be necessary to replace the training for 
attention with education so that life did not 
become a ‘frittering away in listless and 
increasingly perverted pleasures.’  Mass leisure 
without mass education can obviously only 
lead to disaster.  Even mass leisure with flaccid 
mass education will lead to disaster.15 
 
Working within the realm of secular higher 
education, Grant offered something of a 
surprising solution.   
 
Education, and especially adult education, 
ought to lead, in the words … attributed to St. 
Augustine, out of the shadows and imaginings 
into truth: after all, the man we call supremely 
free was sufficiently maladjusted to his 
community to die on the cross, and there is no 
reason to believe we are so much better than 
the people who put him to death.  Education is 
to take men to the unlimited, where there is no 
security, no rest and no peace—except perhaps 
… the peace that passes all understanding.16 
 
Perhaps Grant’s analyses are rather dated in the 
education environment of today, but there may be 
a timeless aspect to them in calling for recognition 
of a certain enduring aim of education—to take 
persons “to the unlimited.”  For Lonergan, the 
unlimited emerges in the unfettered transcendental 
operations of human consciousness and, in my 
view, this is central to education.   
 
It is such an approach to education—really a 
philosophy of education—that transcends the 
mundane and can transform one’s life in the most 
profound ways.  On balance, though, the 
“muddling through” approach can sometimes 
have its successes.  Educators may get some of the 
big issues right, may latch onto brilliance and 
make a positive difference. But is there a way to 
improve the balance sheet? Is there a way better to 
ensure more hits and fewer misses?   
 
I assert that Lonergan’s philosophy and general 
methodology holds promise for a better way. 
While Jesuit-based institutions of higher learning 
have done little to mine the riches of Lonergan’s 
thought for its educational programs, and certainly 
there has been virtually nothing along this line 
within secular education, there could be significant 
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benefits should the mining begin. Lonergan can 
help achieve more fully the mission of Jesuit 
higher education not only in striving more 
intentionally toward an integration and a 
wholeness in our knowing, doing, being, 
caring/loving, but, more importantly, in bringing 
to light and “appropriating” in better ways the 
operations of knowing and the dynamism of 
human consciousness. To be sure, there are 
various Jesuit “tools” to accomplish this, such as 
what is presented in the publication, Teaching to the 
Mission: A Compendium of the Ignatian Mentoring 
Program. This good, practical and insightful 
document constitutes a step in the right direction.  
But it still is not a philosophy of education per se in 
that it does not probe the philosophical level very 
deeply.  What underlies this fine work, rather, is 
the Jesuit “mission,” which has philosophical 
connections, of course, but does not consist of a 
full-fledged philosophy that comes to terms with 
the various dimensions of education at the radical 
levels needed.17   
 
Applications of Lonergan’s thought promises a 
philosophy of education that encounters the big 
issues, corrects attempts at “muddling through,” 
and excavates the mission-driven approach to 
deeper levels. Lonergan offers a thoroughgoing 
and, in my view, convincing18 account of human 
consciousness in its various parts and operations 
that direct one’s knowing, doing, being and 
caring/loving. In general terms, this type of 
illumined consciousness largely constitutes our 
identity as persons. As Charles Taylor argues, such 
elements of “inwardness” serve to create our 
“sense of self.”19  A Lonerganian approach to 
education, I believe, can help educators realize 
greater potential as knowers by more intentionally 
building on the worlds of experience, but then 
going beyond personal experience to map out 
how, in general terms, we become shapers of our 
world in all the good, better and best ways 
possible. This I perceive the promise of 
Lonergan’s grand philosophical vision for 
education.   
 
Elements of a Lonerganian Philosophy of 
Education 
What are the elements of this philosophical vision 
and how do these elements operate in education?  
Briefly, they consist of an account of human 
knowing and an interpolation of this account as a 
general methodology that informs and guides 
stages and processes of teaching and learning.  
While Lonergan’s approach rises from the rich 
Jesuit tradition of education, I emphasize that 
applications of this epistemology and 
methodology are not so restricted.  Lonergan’s 
insights and assertions can be (and are) applied to 
a wide scope of human inquiry and learning where 
reason and openness are key values and 
aspirations.   
 
A Lonergan-inspired vision of education focuses 
on the individual, but it does not espouse a pure 
subjectivism or an entrenched individualism.  Its 
higher aim is the enhancement and development 
of communities, of societies, and of civilization 
itself.  The purpose of a Lonerganian educational 
philosophy, I maintain, is not self-enclosure, but 
self-transcendence.  Its aim is to grasp true 
knowledge wherever it is found, and builds upon a 
desire for what Lonergan calls a “finality” of 
human existence arising from a constant striving 
toward the “higher viewpoint,” to grasp in ever 
greater degrees deeper dimensions of reality.  
Lonergan provides a way for education to achieve 
what Grant calls taking persons “into the 
unlimited.”   
 
How does one tap into this vision?  How does 
one begin to draw on its potential and promise?  
Essentially, through self-understanding and self-
knowledge the pathway Lonergan charts opens 
and expands further in exploring one’s own 
“interiority.”  In the process, one comes to know 
oneself, a human subject, in a new way.  The way 
Lonergan suggests involves four basic “interior” 
operations of the human subject that unfold on 
four distinct but related “levels” of consciousness. 
Three pertain to the question of knowing, and the 
fourth pertains to the question of action, the 
existential question, “What am I going to do about 
what I know?” 
 
The four basic operations yield knowledge and 
embrace decisions that meet the existential 
demand that all human beings be attentive, be 
intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and be 
caring and loving. Simply put, the four basic 
operations are experiencing, understanding, 
judging and deciding.  Developing this in more 
detail, a brief account of these operations is 
presented and a few reflections on education are 
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offered that indicate what promise these 
differentiated but interrelated levels and 
operations hold in framing big issues in education 
and in unfolding as a philosophy of education. 
 
One important clarification needs to be made, 
however. While Lonergan presents his discoveries 
and analyses of how human consciousness 
operates, an aim of Lonergan for those who 
encounter his thought is to discover such 
operations of their own consciousness. The most 
important thing is not what Lonergan says about 
this or that aspect of human consciousness or 
what other thinkers assert about the world of 
human “interiority.”  Rather, the crucially 
important questions concern you, the individual, 
you the educator, you the learner. Lonergan’s 
work thus unfolds as an invitation to self-
discovery and to self-knowledge.    
 
This crucially important point was stressed by 
Lonergan’s chief promoter and colleague, 
Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., in a Festschrift presented 
to Lonergan and published by Continuum in 1964. 
Crowe states in his introductory article, “The 
Exigent Mind,”  
 
Lonergan’s position is that the way to 
understand him is to carry out for ourselves the 
performance of appropriating conscious 
activity.  He has said as much in Insight, he has 
repeated it for years in his lectures, and his 
claim is ignored, sometimes as much by 
disciples as by opponents, both of whom turn 
more readily to the objective products of his 
thought than to their own operations.  Those 
products command respect and deserve 
discussion (otherwise this collection of studies 
[in the Festschrift] would lose much of its 
purpose) but they just are not the main issue.20   
 
By my observation, this point tends to be missed 
often in the expanding field of “Lonergan 
Studies,” the point being that all of this is not so 
much about Lonergan as it is about you, the 
knowing, loving human subject, and about you, 
the educator. Again, in developing an educational 
philosophy that draws on Lonergan, then, the 
main issue becomes self-discovery and self-
knowledge.  Moreover, the beginning point does 
not consist of throwing out everything that one 
has gained thus far in terms of self-knowledge, but 
unfolds as a rethinking, a reconsideration and 
perhaps even a transformation of self-knowledge 
that can take you, as an educator, you as a thinker 
about educational philosophy, to greater heights 
and to deeper depths in personal and professional 
achievement. 
 
Differentiations of Consciousness and 
Elements of Educational Philosophy  
 
Simply put, Lonergan discovered that human 
consciousness—the interior self that constitutes 
one’s “spirituality”—consists of four basic 
operations:  experiencing, understanding, judging 
(also called discerning),21 and deciding. It is 
relatively easy to identify occasions where one has 
experienced, understood, judged, or decided. Take 
a few moments to reflect on how you have 
engaged these activities over the past day, within 
the past hour, or even within the past few 
moments.  As you reflect on these events, you 
may be able to identify different focuses in your 
consciousness as being mainly about one of these 
four activities.  In Lonergan’s analysis, these 
operations of consciousness are also called 
“intentionality” – what predominantly is occurring 
in your consciousness in terms of what you are 
“really after” in any particular occasion—an 
experience, an understanding, a discernment or 
judgment, or a decision.   
 
However, things can quickly become complicated 
as we reflect more deeply.  When we try to 
understand something, for example, we realize it 
does not occur in isolation.  Experience relates to 
the effort to understand, as do previous 
discernments and judgments, and past actions.  In 
fact, as you reflect on the various acts of your own 
consciousness, you may realize they tend to occur 
as single unified event that have many or all of the 
other elements of consciousness operating 
simultaneously to greater or lesser degrees. Thus, 
the ability to make these differentiations within an 
event may be a little more difficult—perhaps quite 
challenging, in fact.  What aspects of an event are 
regarded as “experiencing”?; what elements 
pertain to “understanding”?; what considerations 
of an event can be attributed to efforts at 
“discerning” and “judging”?; and what precisely 
constitutes our “deciding”?  While the four 
operations are easy to grasp intellectually, it’s more 
daunting actually to make these differentiations in 
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the moments and events that constitute our living 
in the real world.   
 
Lonergan calls us to make these differentiations in 
our own lives that then lead to the question of 
applying these types of differentiations regarding 
human “intentionality” to educational philosophy. 
In what follows, each of these differentiations is 
considered and suggestions made as to how 
various philosophical concerns in education may 
accordingly be differentiated.  I consider first, 
experiencing, second, understanding, followed by 
discerning/judging, and then deciding.  Again, this 
does not lead to a full-fledged educational 
philosophy, but rather indicates that promise 
Lonergan’s thought holds for developing a 
thoroughgoing philosophy of education. 
 
Experiencing 
As conscious, sentient human beings we have 
experiences and, as such, experiences of all kinds 
come flooding into consciousness. It’s not just 
sensory experience (hearing, seeing, and so forth) 
but experiences of mental images, feelings and 
thoughts—higher level experiences that tend to be 
more significant—experiences that Dewey called 
“educationally valuable.” In fact, for Lonergan, 
the role of mental images and “imagination” are 
seen to play an enormously important role in what 
constitutes human experience. Another way to 
think about experiences is to regard them as 
“data.” Lonergan regards all experiences as data—
data of sense and data of consciousness—that 
include not only things presented to us via sensory 
perceptions but also our thoughts and feelings 
about these sense data. On a purely experiential 
level, consciousness remains somewhat 
undeveloped, constantly receiving and creating all 
sorts of data, good or bad, significant or trivial, 
from the world external to ourselves and from the 
inner world of feelings and thoughts.  But even on 
this level of “pure” experience, patterns begin to 
emerge and sorting processes begin. Some data 
capture our attention and other data escape our 
notice, or are noticed but immediately disregarded 
or suppressed for some reason. Experiences run 
the scale from the superficial and inconsequential 
to those deemed rich and meaningful. But what is 
the difference in these various types of 
experiences and how does one account for the 
wide range of experiences on the basic level of 
conscious awareness?  
 
Besides positive experiences that enrich our lives, 
we all have negative experiences that can hold us 
back in certain ways, cause us to withdraw from 
further experiences or may be seen to otherwise 
impoverish our lives in some small way, or 
perhaps in very significant ways. This is jumping 
ahead, though, since determining the negative or 
positive experiences unfold on different level of 
operation of consciousness. The point here, 
however, is that we have all kinds of experiences 
over which, initially, we have little control.  As 
“experiencers,” and in order to become better 
experiencers, it is important to notice our 
experiences—to be attentive to them.  Lonergan 
relates one’s noticing to what he calls a key 
imperative, an initial, basic “transcendental 
imperative,” namely, “be attentive.”     
 
Lonergan’s account of experience, as noted, 
centers on a recognition of experiences as a basic 
level in the operations of human consciousness 
that includes not only sensory experiences with 
which we are all familiar, but also experiences of 
intelligence and understanding, of discernment 
and judgment, and experiences of deliberating and 
deciding. These “data of consciousness,” in 
addition to sensory data, often become present to 
us in terms of how we “feel” about our thoughts 
and ideas, our judging and our deciding. These 
data of consciousness become more fully present 
as we notice when and how they occur, what are 
our personal circumstances that led to them, and 
what conditions  lead to similar experiences. 
Lonergan sums up what is meant by “experience” 
as a dimension or level in human consciousness 
this way:   
 
By consciousness is meant an awareness 
immanent in cognitional acts.  But such acts 
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in 
kind with the acts. There is empirical 
consciousness characteristic of sensing, 
perceiving, imagining.  As the content of these 
acts is merely presented or represented, so the 
awareness immanent in the acts is the mere 
givenness of the acts.22   
 
To explain further what is meant by “data of 
consciousness,” an important aspect of 
experiencing is what Lonergan calls “desire.” A 
basic manifestation of desire appears as a drive 
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that propels our consciousness forward in its 
development. On the experiential level there is a 
“desire to know” that anticipates the next level, 
understanding, and even the level following that, 
judging. But desire itself qualifies as an important 
instance of experience. Lonergan states,  
 
…[F]or the guiding orientation of the scientist 
[as a paradigmatic knower] is the orientation of 
inquiring intelligence, the orientation that of its 
nature is a pure, detached, disinterested desire 
simply to know. For there is an intellectual 
desire, an Eros of the mind….23  
 
Experience is not simply for the sake of 
experience, but there is a higher intentionality 
involved, namely, to experience the unfolding of 
intelligence about what we experience.  It is an 
“Eros of the mind,” and not simply “Eros.” While 
this “Eros of the mind,” is an experience, per se, 
its intentionality anticipates understanding and 
knowledge and as such, the desire to know 
propels experience forward in one’s consciousness 
as one seeks for and struggles with intelligibility of 
our experiences.  As such, experience and the 
desire to know constitute so much of what 
teaching and learning are about.  
 
This desire to know is key to Lonergan’s 
cognitional theory but there are many other drives 
that unfold as one becomes a knower, a doer, a 
lover.  These also have great importance to 
education, but since the desire to know is so 
fundamental to consciousness and to learning 
processes, it is important to give special attention 
to this important aspect of our experiential lives.    
 
 
“Experiencing” Related to Education 
Education traditionally has been about primarily 
learning various subjects. Certainly, in the Western 
tradition, subject focus dominated education as far 
back as medieval educational systems centered on 
the Trivium consisting of grammar, logic and 
rhetoric, and the Quadrivium covering arithmetic, 
music, geometry and astronomy. How a subject 
related to your experiences as a learner had little 
consequence, although using the five senses was 
important in the learning process. But what 
remained most important was a student’s ability to 
grasp intellectually what was needed to know 
about a subject and to pass some examination or 
achieve some recognized competency. As 
educators came to critique this mode of education 
they realized that students learn better, learn more, 
and have a more enjoyable and rewarding learning 
experience when a subject taught has deeper 
relevance to their lives, when students can 
experience in some way, directly or indirectly, 
various dimensions of history, of biology, or of 
whatever was being taught and studied. Education 
began to incorporate more experiential and 
experimental approaches to learning. Thus a new 
direction in teaching and learning emerged known 
as “progressive education.”   
 
John Dewey, an early architect of experientially-
based education, explained the importance of 
having “quality experiences” that are 
“educationally worthwhile,” of valuing an 
“experiential continuum” based on habits that 
give rise to the formation of  basic sensibilities and 
“emotional and intellectual attitudes,” that lead to 
“physical, intellectual and moral growth.”24 Dewey 
brilliantly brought to the fore the foundation of 
education grounded in the experience of students.  
However, as a pragmatist and secularist (being 
opposed to “organized religion”), Dewey’s 
philosophical commitments were not well 
developed in terms of the “spiritual” realm, 
though he expressed a belief in the wholeness or 
oneness of knowledge as a sense of the harmony 
and mystery of the universe and our place in it.25  
As such, Dewey recognized a religious or spiritual 
aspect of human existence but his writings do not 
explain in a salient or fuller way the 
“transcendental drive” operative in human 
consciousness, a drive that aims at a universal 
viewpoint, and that energizes and upwardly directs 
the world of human experience toward greater 
meaning, broader realizations of existence, toward 
things greater than oneself, and toward 
transcendent being.  For Dewey, religious 
questions tended to be eclipsed by scientific 
method and inquiry, and matters of the 
transcendental and transcendence do not factor 
much into the learning processes.  
 
A philosophy of education that takes account 
more fully of the Eros of mind and the drive 
toward the transcendental, a philosophy that 
addresses a broader horizon of human experience 
encompassing the “unlimited,”  conceives of 
human experience in richer, more dramatic ways. 
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Lonergan’s account of the structure and 
operations of “experiencing” offers philosophy of 
education new ways to address what counts as 
experience—data of sense and data of 
consciousness—and to redirect education to its 
foundations beyond solely scientific methodology 
to encompass transcendental methodology.  This draws 
attention not only to the subject matter being 
studied, but to the nature of inquiry and studying 
themselves, to the interior life, as it were, of the 
questioning teacher and learner.  Applying 
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis to education, 
educators and learners are called to be attentive to 
their world of experience and to the process of 
experiencing. Much more could be studied, 
researched and written concerning Lonergan’s 
account of experience and the relationship this has 
to other dimensions of human consciousness.  My 
point simply is to acknowledge the basic, 
fundamental importance of experience in 
Lonergan’s thought26  and to suggest for 
educational philosophy there is promise of a 
deeper, richer field of inquiry this opens onto, one 
more than simply sense experience.27   
 
Understanding 
Human experiences occur and they readily fall 
into patterns and those patterns of experience 
tend to repeat. For instance, if you purchase a new 
car, likely immediately you begin to notice every 
other vehicle of that year, make and color you 
pass on the road. Patterns of this experience may 
broaden to where you notice other colors of that 
model, other models of that maker, and models 
with features that yours has, or now you wish your 
car had. These patterns can lead to further 
patterns of experiences that include feelings of 
regret perhaps, or of satisfaction knowing you 
made the right choice, and so forth. Why does this 
happen? Lonergan explains that in the practical 
world of daily living, and in the world of scientific 
inquiry and of scholarship, our patterns of 
experience naturally begin to repeat, our scope of 
noticing expands considerably, and questions 
related to our experiences move us to probe 
possible meanings we attach to these experiences. 
We begin to move from the level of experience to 
a different, but certainly related, level of 
consciousness, that of understanding. 
 
As consciousness develops, we begin to wonder 
about our experiences and start to ask questions.  
Have you ever thought about what a marvelous 
experience it is to ask a question?  In fact, asking 
questions can be a truly  exciting dimension of 
being human. We are knowers, we are persons 
who care, and we are lovers in various ways, 
because we are question-askers. In effect, 
question-asking affirms our existence uniquely as a 
distinct mode of conscious beings-in-the-world.  
When you ask a really good question, it can makes 
you feel really good, perhaps even more so than 
providing a really good answer. In asking a good 
question, one often experiences a particular 
exhilaration. One reason for this may be that 
when we begin to ask questions, a fuller dynamism 
of our consciousness starts to unfold. Our 
consciousness is developing and expanding. As we 
become better question askers, those good 
questions pertain more directly and fully to our 
experiences and bring about the possibility of 
better answers and more satisfying insights.  
 
Referring again to George Grant, a close associate 
of his at McMaster University in Hamilton, 
Ontario, Eugene Combs recalls, 
 
George breaks most of the rules about 
teaching: he rarely completes a sentence, often 
turning an answer to a question into another 
question…. [P]erhaps, above all, his propensity 
to ask questions to answer a question, a 
condition he was born with, makes him the 
teacher he is. George’s questions become part 
of your thinking.  They tend to direct you, 
what to read and which other teachers you 
listen or talk to.  His questions focus your 
attention where you’ve not quite focused 
before. George’s questions change you.28 
 
Combs’s report captures well the role of the 
question in education as it moves one from some 
experience to expanding that experience, to a 
broadening of one’s attention that anticipates 
insight and understanding.  Moving beyond our 
experiences of various kinds, questions can lead to 
understanding, and ultimately to transformation.  
 
Early on in the process of coming to know, a 
main goal in question-asking is to gain 
understanding. Gaining understanding has been a 
topic that has captured the attention of great 
philosophers over the centuries. As noted in this 
essay’s introduction, one recalls Hume’s An Inquiry 
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Concerning Human Understanding and Kant’s three 
great critiques (of “Pure Reason,” “Practical 
Reason” and of “Judgment”). Much of Lonergan’s 
work, but especially his chief philosophical work, 
Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, pertains to 
this field of inquiry. 
 
Lonergan explains that understanding is achieved 
as we seek to make sense of experience, first hand 
(personal) experience and even second hand 
(historical) experience of a family, a community, a 
society. Understanding occurs as we piece things 
together and create order out of the confusion and 
disorder that our “pure” unmediated experiences 
tend to be. Understanding begins to unfold when 
the possible significance and meanings of things 
are grasped.  Meaning is what happens when the 
patterns of experience are grasped or 
conceptualized in some way, when ideas about 
how the elements of our experience can be put 
together and interrelated.  Deeper meaning occurs 
when greater levels and more complexities of 
interrelations are discovered.  Understanding is 
the occurrence of insight, the grasping of 
meaning, when we catch on intellectually to the 
way things are or could be in relation to other 
things. We have such acts of insight (acts of 
understanding) all the time. Some of them are very 
mundane, some largely unnoticed, or some may 
prove to be dramatic, profound and life changing. 
 
The key realization here, however, is not that we 
have insights and understandings, but that there is 
a structure and a process to them all. Lonergan 
draws attention not so much to the content of the 
question or of the answer, but to the types and 
processes of questioning and answering.  This 
realization consists of “insight into insight,” of 
grasping the dynamism at play in question-asking 
and answer-finding processes.  As is sometimes 
said about Jesuit education, it is more about the 
questions than the answers.  For Lonergan this 
tends to be the case, but his approach also 
provides an account of a deep-level grasp of the 
dynamism of the relation between the question 
and the answer.  
 
For Lonergan, the phenomenon of question-
asking and answer-grasping, what is called 
understanding, occurs as an intellectual “coming 
to life,” as it were. It can occur in a moment, in a 
flash of brilliance, when one “sees the light,” 
when one “catches on.” Understanding can also 
occur in a painstaking process of study and 
intellectual struggle over weeks, months and even 
years, leading to when an insight finally surfaces 
and is fully grasped in one’s consciousness.  
However it occurs, in solving a crossword puzzle, 
in developing a unified field theory, or whatever, 
an emotional experience can result—a sense of 
satisfaction, an overwhelming exhilaration, or a 
negative feeling if the insight is dreaded. In such 
instances we see clearly how the levels of 
experience and understanding interrelate and 
promote the other. But then further questions can 
surface, “Is this understanding really true?”, “Can 
I be mistaken?”, and so forth, but these 
subsequent questions pertain to the next level of 
consciousness yearning to unfold.      
 
Much could be said about Lonergan’s exposition 
of this operation, this level of consciousness called 
human understanding; he offers hundreds of 
pages on this in his book, Insight. However, let us 
consider Lonergan’s account of understanding, 
presented here simply and much abbreviated, as it 
related to educational philosophy. 
 
“Understanding” Related to Education 
An education that gives pride of place to insight 
and understanding – and all good education at 
some stage, in one way or another, does this – 
concerns itself largely with the intellectual 
development of the learner and achieving some 
familiarity with a field of knowledge and perhaps 
the acquisition of a skill set. Today, this may be 
referred to as “literacy,” “competency,” 
“proficiency,” and so forth. Such education was 
championed in the last half of the 19th century and 
into the 20th as “liberal” or “general” education, 
and in the middle part of the 20th century as 
“traditional education” (in part as a reaction 
against “progressive education” that seemed 
intellectually weak).  The “Great Books” 
programs, as an example of traditional education, 
focuses primarily on understanding the canon of 
Western thought.  Education dominated by a 
concern for understanding a field of study 
manifests in schools designed for “training” 
purposes, or on educating “professionals” of one 
type or another.  Recent popular movements in 
education focusing on this second level of 
intentionality are Constructivism and 
Constructionism, the latter based largely on the 
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thought and analysis of Jean Piaget. They assert 
that we construct our own meanings and 
understanding, and we construct the “products” 
to be understood. (It should be noted that while 
these movements focus on intellectual pursuits, 
they also have relevance to the third and fourth 
levels, judging and deciding, in that learning 
involves finding solutions and justifying actions.29)  
 
Whatever value understanding holds in education, 
and though it does not encompass the whole story 
since the drama of human consciousness, it 
naturally obtains a central focus. “Insights are a 
dime a dozen,” Lonergan says,30 and they occur all 
the time. Some insights are great and profound 
world-shaping illuminations. Others are mundane, 
used merely to get your clothes on in the morning 
or help put food on the table.  Some insights seem 
so true and compelling while others may be odd 
or outlandish.  In any case, additional questions 
about insights, our alleged understandings, arise 
(or should arise). Lonergan explains further the 
nature of understanding.  
By consciousness is meant an awareness 
immanent in cognitional acts.  But such acts 
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in 
kind with the act….  But there is an intelligent 
consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight, 
and formulation.  On this level cognitional 
process not merely strives for and reaches the 
intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its 
intelligence; it operates intelligently.  The 
awareness is present but it is the awareness of 
intelligence, of what strives to understand, of 
what is satisfied by understanding, of what 
formulates the understood, not as a schoolboy 
repeating by rote a definition, but as one that 
defines because he grasps why that definition 
hits things off.31   
 
While the content of what is understood is 
important, note that Lonergan’s particular focus 
centers on the intelligence about that 
understanding.  Accordingly, what is aimed at in 
understanding covers not only what is achieved in 
grasping intelligibility about something, but one 
achieves a clear sense of why the intelligible is 
intelligible. It allows, for instance, a person to 
offer a definition or an expression of one’s 
understanding in their own words.   
 
As we allow—actually propel—our understanding 
to develop and flourish, we are meeting the 
second key “transcendental imperative,” “be 
intelligent” in tandem with the first transcendental 
imperative, “be attentive.”  
 
Once we grasp an understanding of something, 
further questions emerge about our understanding 
a new mode of consciousness takes shape, a new 
operation unfolds. The activities of one’s 
consciousness, as it were, engage a different gear, 
and the drive forward moves the quest of 
knowledge to a different level, but this is for the 
next section.    
 
The focus in education and educational 
philosophy on understanding and intelligence is 
well-known, but Lonergan’s philosophy calls forth 
a further dimension, namely a fuller understanding 
of the nature of human inquiry and intelligence.  It 
requires an understanding of understanding, one 
that shifts the focus from merely teaching and 
learning an accepted canon of knowledge to 
grasping the nature of intelligence itself 
undergirding that canon.32 It allows the teacher 
and the learner to expand upon that knowledge 
base and to extend it and revise its new directions.   
 
Bringing Lonergan’s philosophy to the table of 
current discussion in educational philosophy, 
certain connections can be made.  For instance, 
what contribution and critique could Lonergan 
offer concerning Kieran Egan’s exposition of 
mythic, romantic, philosophic and ironic modes of 
understanding and their implications for 
education?33 How could Lonergan’s exposition of 
human understanding and consciousness be used 
to interpret or critique Howard Gardner’s account 
of multiple intelligences?  How could both Egan’s 
and Howard’s positions so influential in education 
today be modified in helpful ways?34 In my 
estimation, Lonergan probes more deeply, more 
philosophically these questions of human 
intelligence than do Egan or Gardner and discerns 
a more generalized account of human 
understanding. As such, Lonergan’s analysis 
applies to a broader scope of educational concern 
by encompassing not only the narrow educational 
questions related to intelligence but to wider 
educational concerns related to social theology, 
the notion of human development, and ultimately 
the questions of the meaning of life. And with 
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these concerns, another level of human 
consciousness comes to the fore. 
 
Judging 
As human consciousness develops in healthy, 
developmental ways, we begin to wonder if our 
insights or the insights of others are reasonably 
accurate, solidly correct and can be counted as 
“true,” or completely wrong-headed, or perhaps 
something else along this continuum from wrong 
to right, from bad to good. As we wonder about 
insights and understandings, new questions arise 
in the inquiring mind that propels one’s 
consciousness to a whole new level. On this 
further level, reflections, discernments, 
assessments of the evidence, surface that then lead 
to the making of judgments.  And when a 
judgment occurs, Lonergan states, depending on 
the quality of that judgment, understanding may 
be posited as “knowledge.”   
 
Human beings, however, are not perfect creatures 
and thus not perfect knowers. In fact, we are 
prone to blind spots, to barking up the wrong 
tree, so to speak, to seeing only what we want to 
see and ignoring all sorts of factors that may turn 
out to be important. We can adjust or correct 
some of these shortcomings relatively easily and 
quickly but others we cannot correct without a 
great deal of honesty, effort and commitment, and 
perhaps personal transformation in some measure.   
 
Questions arise as to how we can make a needed 
assessment, achieve desired discernment and 
overcome the personal, group, or cultural issues 
that may stand in our way.  For Lonergan, 
addressing these new and deeper questions 
involves making good and better judgments. In 
simplest terms, a good and true judgment about 
something rests upon knowing how well some 
particular understanding accounts for all the 
relevant data in any given situation. These data, 
again, are data of sense and data of consciousness 
that include thoughts, feelings, ideas, perceptions, 
and so forth, and we account for these 
conceptually by grasping possible meanings and 
obtaining understanding. Understanding, of 
course, may be correct or incorrect, or some 
gradation thereof, so surfaces the need and 
intention of “judging,” an affirmation or a denial 
of an understanding.   
 
More specifically, on the level of judgment we 
raise the question of how well the concepts and 
suggested meanings we grasp have answered all 
the questions that could be asked concerning 
some particular experience, that is, about some set 
of data. In the process of discerning and judging, 
we return to some possible explanation that we 
have settled upon, but then raise further questions 
about how well the explanation accounts for the 
data. In the process of judging, ideally all the 
possible relevant questions about the data and 
possible understandings are answered 
satisfactorily. Increasingly the relevant questions 
become fewer and fewer as satisfying answers are 
attained.  As questions diminish, an understanding 
or explanation under scrutiny becomes more 
“secure,” and we approach a moment when we 
can make a sound judgment, “yes” or “no,” 
“maybe,” or perhaps find that a judgment is still 
not ready to be made (which is a judgment in its 
own right). The probability that a judgment is true 
can move closer and closer to confidence or 
certainty if one is truly open to unrestricted 
questioning. For Lonergan, this is key to the 
judging process since there are myriad ways free 
and open questioning can be blocked. He calls 
these blockages “biases,” and they can take on 
various forms.35 As this type of questioning 
proceeds, Lonergan explains, at some point we 
can reach what he calls grasping the “virtually 
unconditioned.”  That is to say, our answers and 
our assertions no longer have unanswered 
questions. All the relevant questions that can be 
posed have been posed and they have been 
answered in a satisfying way. We are at a place 
where a reasonable judgment can be made, and in 
a certain sense, we are compelled to make the 
judgment in that not doing so may appear to be 
unreasonable. When this occurs, not only do we 
“understand” but we also “know.”  If, however, 
all relevant questions are not asked and answered 
in a satisfying way, then we have something less 
than true knowledge. Our knowing is “in part” as 
St. Paul suggests, and our judgment may be 
rendered in some degree of probability.  
 
The result of making a sound judgment, Lonergan 
argues, is achieving true “objectivity.”  This type 
of objectivity is not a matter merely of looking 
“out there” to see what’s “real” to oneself, but 
rather it is a matter of making a sound, 
invulnerable judgment about our insights into the 
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world or experience—the world of sense data and 
the world of data of consciousness. As we have 
seen, this can occur only when the full and, as 
much as is possible, unimpeded operations of our 
own consciousness unfold. So, objectivity for 
Lonergan is not a matter of negating our 
subjectivity that may, as some believe, taint or 
skew “objectivity.”  Rather, as Lonergan states, 
“objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”36 
 
Lonergan takes this a step further by suggesting 
that when we truly know something, what we 
know is the “real world.” Authentic knowledge is 
not some illusion, not merely some set of 
interesting ideas, not some “reality” that we have 
created simply for ourselves, but it is discovering 
in verifiable and reasonable ways what actually 
exists. And we know this to be true because all the 
relevant questions, in an unrestricted way, have 
been answered so as to fully account for all the 
relevant data. When questioning has reached this 
level, we are compelled to affirm what is actually 
so, what is “real.” Lonergan calls this method of 
questioning and wrestling with the answers, and 
then finally settling on what actually is the case, 
“critical realism.”  In Lonergan’s words,  
 
By consciousness is meant an awareness 
immanent in cognitional acts.  But such acts 
differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in 
kind with the acts…. Finally, on the third level 
of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and 
judgment, there is rational consciousness.  It is 
the emergence and the effective operation of a 
single law of utmost generality, the law of 
sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is 
the unconditioned.  It emerges as a demand for 
the unconditioned and a refusal to assent 
unreservedly on any lesser ground.37 
 
It is on this level where the third “transcendental 
imperative” is played out—“be reasonable.” 
 
“Judging” in Educational Philosophy 
“Judgment” has been a longstanding issue in 
education. It surfaces especially in educational 
traditions where the chief goal is “wisdom.”38 
Wisdom remains an important focus in 
educational theory and tends to span Lonergan’s 
levels of judging and deciding.39  More recently, 
questions of judgment appear in newer models of 
education focused explicitly on what is commonly 
called “critical thinking.”  While educators today 
have the mandate to teach critical thinking, one 
might be hard-pressed to find a well-developed 
philosophy of judgment associated with it. There 
are guides and manuals that are used in the 
classroom to promote critical thinking, but these 
focus on problem solving, on ways to look at 
situations, and help persons think more 
reflectively and effectively.40   While focus seems 
to be more on exercises and techniques than on a 
larger view of how consciousness operates and 
what it means to be a reasonable and wise human 
being, Lonergan’s thought, however, offers exactly 
this for educational philosophy.41   
 
To be sure, there is much to recommend in this 
now well-established field of curriculum 
development and pedagogy centered on critical 
thinking.  John Chaffee’s “Preface” to his third 
edition of Thinking Critically (1990) explains the 
larger intention of the text as “based on the 
assumption … that learning to think more 
effectively is a synthesizing process, knitting 
critical thinking abilities together with academic 
content and the fabric of student’s experiences. 
Thinking learned this way becomes a constitutive 
part of who students are.”42 The larger vision of 
critical thinking for Chaffee includes the crucially 
important grasp of humanness, of values, a world 
view, and the making of choices that forms one’s 
world.  He states further, “teaching people to 
become critical thinkers does not mean simply 
equipping them with certain intellectual tools; it 
involves their personal transformation and its 
commensurate impact on the quality of their lives 
and those around them.  This is truly education at 
its most inspiring.”43 Indeed. The practical aim of 
Chaffee’s book, however, is to provide guidance 
for teachers to nurture and promote critical 
thinking for students.  Not being a text on 
educational philosophy, these larger issues, this 
grand vision and laudable assumptions are not 
explicitly developed.   
 
Some of these assumptions and philosophical 
underpinnings of critical thinking, at least in part, 
can be found in a much earlier text by W. H. 
Werkmeister, An Introduction to Critical Thinking.44  
While Chaffee envisions a larger relevance of 
critical thinking to life in general, Werkmeister 
explores the classic philosophical categories of 
critical thinking, and in this regard, the 
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connections of Lonergan’s notion of judgement to 
critical thinking appear rather convincingly.  
Werkmeister explains critical thinking in terms of 
the “rational ideal,” this being, “the application of 
critical habits of thought to all practical problems 
of human existence, and the employment of 
rational criteria in the evaluation of all opinion and 
prospective beliefs.”45  Such thought processes for 
Werkmeister are “proper subject matter for the 
branch of inquiry known as Logic.”46 His rather 
substantive text explores the dimensions and 
functions of reason and rationality in relation to 
logic traditionally understood, symbolic logic, 
statistical method and affirmations of truth.  In 
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, these are 
questions of judgment.   
 
In short, Werkmeister provides a thoroughgoing 
account of critical thinking as the rational, reason-
driven dimensions of human thought and Chaffee 
offers practical strategies to incorporate these in 
curriculum, but it is Lonergan who reveals a larger 
framework that differentiates more fully the 
distinctive rational operations of thought and how 
these are integrated with other aspects of human 
consciousness. 
 
Critical thinking as it appears now in many 
curricula in various ways ought to be championed, 
but it seems to be lacking an explicitly developed 
and fuller vision of what education ultimately 
should entail—self-understanding, self-knowledge 
and personal authenticity, each of which in 
Lonergan’s thought stems from good judging. A 
philosophy of education, in my view, could be 
expanded in helpful ways by drawing on 
Lonergan’s account of this third level of 
intentionality, by providing more satisfying 
opportunities and strategies for teachers and 
learners to become good, better, more sound, and 
trustworthy discerners and judgers—not only in 
critically thinking about some field of academic 
inquiry, but in other areas of one’s life.  Both 
Chaffee and Werkmeister suggest this, but in 
discerning and judging, as Lonergan maps them 
out, teachers and learners are propelled forward 
through a deepening self-knowledge and the 
promotion of effective caring for others and for 
the world.  This we see emerging more fully in the 
next level of conscious intentionality, deciding.  
 
 
Deciding 
In Lonergan’s system of thought, once we become 
good knowers (that is to say, “good judgers”—
since knowledge culminates in an act of sound 
judgment), we also begin to catch on to what 
knowing really is. Knowing is not merely having a 
good look at something, or, as Lonergan says, not 
a matter of merely grasping the “already out there 
now real.”47  Understanding what really counts as 
knowledge, and then knowing what knowing is, 
for Lonergan truly makes all the difference in the 
world for it commits one, and for educational 
philosophy it commits the teacher and the learner, 
to a life-time of being better experiencers, deeper 
understanders, more careful and considered 
judgers, and ultimately wise and responsible 
deciders. This unfolds in education as we begin to 
apply more intentionally and in better ways those 
operations of consciousness to all aspects of life. 
We begin to make our way in the world by 
knowing what is truly good and deciding to make 
good choices based on enriched experiences, 
greater intelligence and sounder judgments. It is 
what Aristotle calls “phronesis” (practical wisdom) 
and what Alasdair MacIntyre and others champion 
as “virtue ethics.”48   
 
Basically, our consciousness takes on yet another 
mode of operating when we are confronted with 
the question of what to do about what we know. 
The answer could be to do nothing, but that is an 
answer nonetheless, or perhaps one actually 
decides that some course of action is the “right” 
or the “best” one to follow.  The answer also 
could be to wait, to hold off on acting, for any 
number of reasons. As we operate on the level of 
deciding and make our way in the world, we 
become participants more fully in the life of the 
family, a group, a society, a culture.  On this level, 
the moral and ethical dimensions of human life 
come into play in the real world—questions of 
how to treat others, how better to conduct oneself 
in the world and how best to live one’s life in 
accord with the good. One finds in their own 
history the values that promote that which is true 
and good. On the level of deciding, optimally, one 
not only thinks about “the good” and that which 
is “right,” but actually seeks to do “good,” do the 
right thing, and advance the “common good.” 
 
Lonergan explains human development in terms 
of this level of consciousness. 
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In fact, the emergence of the fourth level of 
deliberation, evaluation, choice is a slow 
process that occurs between the ages of three 
and six.  Then the child’s earlier affective 
symbiosis with the mother is complemented by 
relations with the father who recognizes in the 
child a potential person, tells him or her what 
he or she may and may not do, sets before him 
or her a model of human conduct, and 
promises to good behavior the later rewards of 
the self-determining adult.  So the child 
gradually enters the world mediated by 
meaning and regulated by values and, by the 
age of seven, is thought to have attained the 
use of reason.  Still this is only the beginning of 
human authenticity.  One has to have passed 
well beyond the turmoil of puberty before 
becoming fully responsible in the eyes of the 
law.  One has to have found out for oneself 
that one has to decide for oneself what one is 
to make of oneself; one has to have proved 
oneself equal to that moment of existential 
decision; and one has to have kept on proving 
it in all subsequent decisions, if one is to be an 
authentic human person.49  
 
On this level of deciding the fourth 
“transcendental imperative” is played out—“be 
responsible.”50 
 
It is on this level that existential philosophy takes 
its cue but tends, perhaps, to privilege the mere 
act of deciding above all else. Notably, 
existentialists Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean Paul 
Sartre praised the heroic act of deciding in face of 
the ultimate meaningless of life and the abyss 
towards which all human existence is drawn. 
Lonergan, however, as a different sort of 
existentialist, stresses the importance of meaning 
and reasonableness that lead to an existence 
deemed “authentic,” one where the desire to 
know and the marshalling of the full measure of 
human consciousness expresses the transcendental 
drive toward “transcendence.”    
 
Deciding in Educational Philosophy 
More than valuing equally all decision-making and 
championing “courage” in making decisions in the 
face of human destruction, as may be a position 
for some existentialist philosophers, Lonergan’s 
philosophy, and a philosophy of education that 
would draw on it, prizes reasonable and 
responsible decision-making that expresses, or 
seeks to express, in the real world that which is 
truly “good,” “right,” and “true.” In practical 
terms, it is a philosophy of education that regards 
moral development, a concern for peace and 
justice, service to the community and citizenship 
as integral to teaching and learning and to 
personal development. Lonergan, being a Jesuit 
philosopher,51 stressed the importance of the 
decisional operations of human consciousness as a 
set of distinct operations that unfold in terms of 
highly differentiated but integrated sets of 
cognitional acts that establish what counts as 
knowledge generally, and what counts as 
knowledge of “the good.”  Persons are called 
upon to “make the good world better”52 by 
making decisions based on what counts as the 
good and the right and the true, and seeing those 
decisions actually lead to action.    
 
Of course we find in educational theory and 
philosophy expressions of this decisional level of 
human consciousness.  More often than not the 
concern and focus in education centers on 
meaning, understanding and interpretation, and 
developing reasoning and critical skills. However, 
one of the more popular recent movements in 
educational theory, Constructionism, based largely 
on the thought and analysis of Jean Piaget, brings 
to the fore decision-making related to social 
construction of the “physical” environment.”53 To 
be sure, the movements of constructionism and its 
companion theory in education, “Constructivism,” 
are complex and multi-dimensional and build on 
the notion that individuals create for themselves 
their world of understanding and being. But with 
the aid of Lonergan’s thought this concern has 
been more deeply understood and critiqued,54 and 
in particular, which is my contention, understood 
better as arising from distinct intentionalities but 
interrelated operations of conscious. 
 
Perhaps the area of educational thought that more 
clearly addresses the concrete world of human 
affairs stems from political philosophy, and in 
particular, the rather large topic of citizenship.  
UNESCO defines citizenship education as 
“educating children, from early childhood, to 
become clear-thinking and enlightened citizens 
who participate in decisions concerning society. 
‘Society’ is here understood in the special sense of 
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a nation with a circumscribed territory which is 
recognized as a state.”55  Educational philosophy 
has for decades, and longer, addressed citizenship 
as a key aim whose purpose is to support 
democracy and democratic institutions.  The 
underlying belief is that an uneducated population 
threatens good collective decision-making.   
 
One of the chief architects of social philosophy 
today, John Rawls, was challenged in an influential 
book by educational philosopher from Stanford 
University, Eamonn Callan,56 in which he argues 
against Rawls’ limited notion of justice and a 
comprehensive liberalism in favor of a political 
liberalism that values diversity, and within that, 
autonomy and moral virtue rooted in 
reasonableness and the ability to discern 
“unreason.” Callan states, “… only to the extent 
that we have thought seriously together about the 
good life and the good society that we can expect 
to find a common standpoint of justification that 
deserves our allegiance.” 57 As citizens are charged, 
then, not only to affirm what the good life and the 
good society entails, citizens are then called by 
Lonergan to decide and to act, to “be 
responsible,” and to actually bring about the good. 
 
Critique and Summary 
 
It is a mistake to suggest that the various levels 
and operations Lonergan elucidated are new to 
educational philosophy. The opposite, in fact, is 
the case. Many important themes and concerns in 
educational philosophy relate to one of, or 
combinations of, the four levels he has identified.  
What’s new in Lonergan, I maintain, is his 
thoroughgoing account of the differentiations of 
the key elements of consciousness, and thus to 
promise the ability to differentiate key elements of 
education and educational philosophy.  His grand 
system of thought, as explained throughout his 
writings, not only makes these differentiations but 
also explains and advances the interrelations and 
the integration of these differentiations. Thus is 
promised also a way to grasp the interrelations and 
integrations of various elements and expressions 
of educational philosophy.  Lonergan believed 
that the four basic patterns of operations, of 
experiencing, understanding, discerning and 
deciding, are fundamental to everything human 
beings know and do—whether or not we 
acknowledge, understand or affirm them.  When 
we don’t acknowledge them, we operate in 
“undifferentiated consciousness” and when we do 
acknowledge and understand them, we operate in 
“differentiated consciousness.”  Undifferentiated 
consciousness, to be sure, does have its successes, 
but, Lonergan maintains, the conscious and 
intentional human subject, for my purposes the 
educator and the learner, operating in a mode of 
differentiated consciousness can more fully and 
authentically achieve one’s potentialities.   
 
These operations of consciousness unfold in 
response to various sets of questions related to 
each of these four levels. In fact, it is the role and 
function of “the question” to bring to light these 
differentiations and to promote the operations of 
consciousness to higher levels of integration. 
Together, the operations of consciousness propel 
us to new heights of discovery and learning, to a 
more deeply grounded authenticity, where we in 
ever greater degrees acknowledge who we are as 
conscious, knowing and caring human beings, and 
then operate explicitly in terms of that 
acknowledgment. We become more authentic 
knowers and doers as we unrestrictedly ask 
questions concerning the four transcendental 
imperatives of being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable and responsible.  Moreover, Lonergan 
has identified the broad lines of what human 
beings achieve when individually and collectively 
these levels and operations increasingly become 
realized—as persons, as communities, as societies.  
A new mode of existence comes into view when 
we fully and profoundly become committed to 
being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible 
and loving.  Although it is beyond the scope of 
this essay to delve into the particularities of this 
promise, still it could be an exciting exercise to 
reflect on what the results could be for one’s own 
life and the life of a community.     
 
For the field of education, it is my contention that 
these differentiated and integrated operations can 
place education on a new, intriguing pathway. 
First, there is the promise to place education on a 
solid methodological, philosophical footing that 
helps teachers and students achieve the most in 
their formal studies and in life-long learning, and 
helps educators realize greater integration of the 
far too often isolated and imperialistic sets of 
disciplines that appear in institutions of learning. 
Second, Lonergan’s promise envisions an ability to 
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understand a wide range of educational 
philosophies that often are seen to be at odds, but 
can be seen to be complementary within the larger 
framework of consciousness differentiations and 
their interrelations.  Third, with Lonergan there is 
the promise to critique these philosophies by 
showing in what ways they may be only partial 
perspectives and limited solutions in an education 
that demands a more comprehensive approach 
and engagement. And fourth, a Lonerganian 
approach to education can help bring persons and 
communities to greater realizations of the 
common good and to greater expressions of 
authentic existence, and to benefit by new 
dimensions of self-knowledge and a deeper 
knowledge of the world in which we live.  
Ultimately, there is the promise to enable 
educators to wrestle with the questions of ultimate 
meaning and reality in more confident and 
compelling ways.    
 
In recommending the promise Lonergan holds for 
education and educational philosophy, I offer 
some pause for thought. These take the form of a 
few questions that for me remain still 
unaddressed.  Does Lonergan rely too heavily on 
the scientific paradigm for understanding 
completely what counts as knowing (as would be 
the complaint of George Grant referred to earlier), 
and if so, precisely in what ways is Lonergan’s 
account of the structure and operations of human 
consciousness limited? What then might be the 
correctives?  Are there other types of knowing 
beyond Lonergan’s cognitional theory that are 
legitimate but which reveal variant structures and 
processes of consciousness?  I am reminded of the 
work of Temple Grandin on the autistic brain and 
that thinking and “knowing” consist primarily of 
pictures rather than words and concepts, and 
occur as single instances of knowledge rather than 
a cumulative process of experiencing, 
understanding and judging endemic to empirical 
method.58  Is Lonergan’s account general enough 
to accommodate elements of human knowing 
outside of the empirical paradigm? Does 
educational research demonstrate the effectiveness 
and value of mapping a broad approach to 
education based on the structure and operations 
of human consciousness?  Does it follow that, 
simply because our consciousness operates in an 
invariant pattern, education should (or optimally) 
follow this pattern?  Could the argument be made 
that education occurs not as an operation of a 
single consciousness but rather as an interplay of 
various “consciousnesses,” as contended by 
Gardner and Egan. Moreover, where 
intersubjectivity occurs– as it does dramatically in 
education with students and teachers in myriad 
ways—does intersubjectivity also engage the same 
general structure and operations as personal 
subjectivity, or are there different, equally 
fundamental, elements of human consciousness 
that come into play in person-to-person and group 
dynamics?   
 
As Lonergan suggests of the nature of human 
consciousness, further questions arise, and these 
are some of mine. Answers to any of these 
questions may perhaps not prove to be 
detrimental or devastating to Lonergan’s promise 
to education mapped out in this essay; they may in 
fact prove to be additional support for this 
particular approach. But these, and probably a 
host of other questions, still need to be asked, 
probed and answered satisfactorily. At the end of 
the day, however, it is probably safe to say that in 
whatever ways education can be enhanced by a 
deepened, enriched and enlivened experiencing, 
understanding, discerning and judging, and by 
bringing greater clarity and wisdom to one’s 
deciding, then that expression of education is on a 
right track. This is to say that education would do 
well, practically and philosophically, to appropriate 
in more intentional ways these differentiated yet 
interrelated operations and thus begin to realize 
Lonergan’s promise to education. 
 
There also is a final cautionary note I mention 
specifically related to the promise suggested here 
of Lonergan—that this is a rather preliminary, 
sketchy, and by no means a broadly-based account 
of the myriad applications Lonergan’s thought can 
have for education, and many further dimensions 
could, and at some point should, be explored, 
such as his notion of the “self-correcting process 
of learning,” his notion of development, and his 
notion of a new social order, “cosmopolis.”  
These are for another time. The aim of this essay 
has been admittedly modest, simply seeking to 
introduce educators to an important mind of the 
20th century, and to indicate what I believe 
applications of his thought have for education 
today and tomorrow.  
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